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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Utah code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section
78-2a-3(d).

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS
CORRECT.

Standard of Review —

Conclusions of law are accorded no

particular deference, but rather are reviewed for correctness.
Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

The

appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions.

Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah

1989).

II.

WHETHER

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ABUSED

ITS

DISCRETION

IN

ADMITTING EXHIBITS 1 AND 7 AND RELATED TESTIMONY.

Standard of Review —

"It is well settled that trial court

rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not to be overturned
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion."

State v.

Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) citing State v. Gray. 717
P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

"In reviewing

questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given
-5-

to the trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion. •• Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801
P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1316.

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.

Standard of Review —
"strictly limited."

The review of issues of

fact is

Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Company, 846

P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App. 1993); Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div.
of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Kimball
v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

"When challenging the

trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate that
despite such evidence the factual findings are clearly erroneous."
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992); Hoth v.
White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1990).

The appellate court

will view the facts from the record "in the light most favorable to
the trial court's findings." Hoth v. White at 216, citing State v.
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 474 (Utah 1990).

IV.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.

Standard of Review —

See standard at I. above.

V.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Standard of Review —

A trial court's grant or denial of a

motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion.

Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377

(Utah 1988); Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d
1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake Electr. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W.
Constr. Inc. .

767 P.2d

125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The

appellate court shall "presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984).

DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a
request for discovery with a response that was complete when made
is under no duty to supplement his response to include information
thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his
response with respect to any questions directly addressed
to (A) the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness
at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to
testify, and the substance of his testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response if he obtains information upon the basis of
which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when
made, or (B) he knows that the response though correct
-7-

when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance
a knowing concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by
order of the court, agreement of the parties, or at any
time prior to trial through new requests for
supplementation of prior responses.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal to this Court from the trial court's

entry of a Judgment against the Plaintiff, entered on March 15,
1993, after a bench trial and after the trial court's denial of
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify or in the Alternative for a New Trial,
filed July 8, 1993. The underlying case involves the Plaintiff's
suit to recover moneys owed to the Plaintiff for goods and services
provided to the Defendant by the Plaintiff in the course of repair
of the Defendant's truck, and a counter-claim by the Defendant for
damages sustained by the Defendant due to the Plaintiff's loss of
the transmission from the truck and the Plaintiff's damage to the
engine of the truck.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL
A.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant on

March 27, 1992, alleging Breach of Contract and unjust enrichment
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based on the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff for parts and
labor rendered by the Plaintiff on behalf of the Defendant.
B.

On April 17, 1992, the Defendant filed an answer and

Counterclaim

alleging

damages

resulting

from

the

loss

of a

transmission and damage to the engine of a truck through the
negligent actions of the Plaintiff.
C. The Plaintiff filed an answer to Defendant's Counterclaim
on May 13, 1992.
D.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's

Counterclaim, based on the Statute of Limitations, on May 13, 1992.
E. On August 25, 1992, Judge S. Mark Johnson entered an order
denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.
F.

On December 17, 1992, the Defendant filed a Motion to

Recuse Judge Johnson.
G.

Judge Johnson subsequently recused himself and Judge

Dutson heard the case.
H.

Trial was held on February 16, 1993, at 9:00 a.m., in the

Bountiful Circuit Court.
I.

At trial, the court again denied Plaintiff's Motion to

Dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim.
J.

Defendant's Exhibit #1 was admitted into evidence over

the Plaintiff's objection. (Record at 236-239).
K.

The trial court found that the Plaintiff had in fact sold

the Defendant a rebuilt transmission for his trust for $3,299.27.
L.

The trial court found that said transmission subsequently

disappeared while in the possession of the Plaintiff.
-9-

M.

The trial court found that the Plaintiff had a duty to

the Defendant to protect the transmission from loss and that said
duty was breached.
N.

At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Dutson granted

judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,054.69 plus
prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% and judgment in favor of
the Defendant in the amount of $3,299.37 plus prejudgment interest
at the rate of 10%.
0.

(Record at page 171).

The trial court found that, after off-setting Plaintiff's

claim against the Defendant, the Defendant was damaged by the
Plaintiff's loss of the transmission in the amount of $3,314.29.
(Record at 282-285).
P.

Judgment was entered against the Plaintiff March 15,

1993, in the net amount of $3,314.29.
Q.

On March 25, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend

the Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial.
R.

On May 17, 1993, Judge Dutson denied the Plaintiff's

Motion noting that the Court's decision on the Judgment was based
on a "totality of the evidence presented at trial..." (Record at
120) .
III. DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT
At the close of the trial, the trial court rendered an oral
decision awarding the Plaintiff judgement against the Defendant in
the amount of $1,054.69, plus interest at 10% from September 1987,
through the date of trial in the amount of $580.09. The Defendant
was awarded judgement against the Plaintiff in the amount of
-10-

$3,299.37, plus interest at 10% from September 1987, through the
trial date in the amount of $1,649.70. Off-setting the Plaintiff's
judgement against the Defendant's judgment allows for a total
judgment in favor of the Defendant against the Plaintiff in the
amount of #3,314.29 to accrue interest from the date of judgment.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June of 1987, the Defendant had the Plaintiff install a

rebuilt transmission in his truck for $3,299.27. (Record at 234-35,
258-259).

Defendant's truck broke down in January of 1988 and he

hired the Plaintiff to repair said truck.

The Plaintiff had the

truck brought to his shop, where he removed the transmission and
then discovered that there were serious problems with the engine.
At

the

request

of

the

Defendant, the

Plaintiff

placed

the

transmission and other parts into the bed of the truck and parked
it on his lot.

The Defendant decided that rather than repair the

truck he would sell it with a good transmission and a bad engine.
The Defendant sold the truck to Steven Flanders and when Mr.
Flanders retrieved the truck from the Plaintiff's shop on or about
April 1, 1988, the transmission was missing. At the time of trial,
the transmission had yet to be turned over to Mr. Flanders or the
Defendant.

The Defendant is responsible to Mr. Flanders for the

transmission or reimbursement for the value of said transmission
(Record at 177-178) and, therefore, the Defendant was damaged by
the Plaintiff's

loss of said transmission

$3,299.37.
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in the amount of

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff's argument on appeal can be broken down into
three chronological stages:
1) Pretrial —

Whether the Defendant's counterclaim

should have been dismissed based on the statute of
limitations; 2) Trial — Whether the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting evidencef whether the trial
court's findings were clearly erroneous, and whether the
trial court erred as a matter of law in entering judgment
in favor of the Defendant;
3) Post Trial —

Whether the trial court abused it's

discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

It is clearly the accepted law in Utah that a counterclaim
that was not barred at the commencement of the action will not
thereafter be barred.

The Plaintiff filed his complaint on March

27, 1992. The Plaintiff claims that the facts establish April
1, 1988, as the date of the event giving rise to the claim

—

nearly four years prior to the commencement of Defendant's action - and that the statute of limitations on said counterclaim is four
years.

The Plaintiff will not argue these points as they are not

at issue on appeal.

Rather, under existing Utah law and applying

the Defendant's interpretation of these facts, it is clear that the
Plaintiff's counterclaim was not barred under the statute of
limitations on March 27, 1992, and therefore was not barred when
actually filed on April 17, 1992.
-12-

Therefore, the trial court

properly denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the court on
appeal must affirm the trial court's ruling.
The Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing appellee to introduce Exhibits 1 and 7
and to elicit testimony related to said exhibits. To the contrary#
the

record

clearly

supports

the

trial

court's

exercise

of

discretion and therefore the court on appeal must affirm the
court's ruling.
The Defendant has further failed to marshal the evidence to
show that the factual findings of the trial court were clearly
erroneous.

Rather, the record clearly supports the trial court's

findings that the Plaintiff had a duty to protect from the loss of
the transmission, that the transmission was lost, and that the
Defendant was damaged as a result of the loss of the transmission.
The appellate court, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the findings, must uphold the trial courts findings of fact.
Based on its findings the trial court was correct in entering
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The trial court found that the
Defendant

was

responsible

for

the

loss

of

the

Plaintiff's

transmission and that said loss damaged the Plaintiff in the amount
of

$3,299.37.

Therefore, the trial court

correctly ordered

judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the above-stated amount.
This decision of the trial court was clearly proper and the court
on appeal must affirm said judgment.
Finally, the Defendant completely fails to show an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Defendant's
-13-

Motion for a New Trial. The trial court's decision was based on a
totality of the evidence and the trial court was definitely in a
better position to judge the evidence presented and the credibility
of the witnesses at trial. The record clearly supports the court's
judgment and there being no abuse of discretion the court on appeal
must affirm the trial court's decision.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Conclusions of law are reviewed by the appellate court for

correctness and are accorded no particular deference.

Scharf v.

BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). In reviewing the trial
court's order of judgment against the Appellant, the appellate
court should use the trial court's findings of fact and apply the
proper rule of law.
The

Appellant

argues

that

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations had run on the Appellee's counterclaim and therefore
the counterclaim should have been dismissed.

Assuming, arguendo.

that the Appellant is correct in placing the date of the event
giving rise to the claim at April 1, 1988, and further assuming
that the four year statute of limitations as provided in Section
78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code is the correct statute for this action
(both issues being questions of fact not at issue on appeal), the
counterclaim was properly before the court and the trial court was
correct in denying the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
-14-

"While there is a difference of opinion on the question, the
majority of the courts hold that a counterclaim based on a cause of
action which is not barred at the time of the commencement of
plaintiff's action is not thereafter barred because not pleaded
before the expiration of the full statutory time." Lewis v.
Merrill, 365 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Sup.Ct. of Or. 1961); 34 AmJur. 205,
Limitations of Actions § 249; 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions §
285 p. 342; Annotation, 127 A.L.R. 909.
In Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court held that
"a counterclaim which arises out of the transaction alleged in the
complaint and is in existence, at the time the complaint is filed,
and is not then barred by a statute of limitations, will not be
barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter.

The

statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed." DoxeyLayton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976).
A more recent Utah case which follows this reasoning, Moffitt
v. Barr, provides an explanation of the policy and reasoning behind
such a rule, detailing three reasons why a counterclaim such as the
one in the instant case should not be barred.
First, the court in Moffitt indicates that such a dismissal of
a counterclaim would "provide unscrupulous plaintiffs with a means
of sabotaging a defendant's right to assert a valid counterclaim."
Moffitt v. Barr, 837 P.2d 572, 574 (Utah App. 1992).
Secondly, the court in Moffitt states that

"statutes of

limitation are designed to promote justice, by discouraging delay
in litigation and preventing surprise through the revival of stale
-15-

claims." Id. at 574 (Citations omitted).

To allow a dismissal of

the counterclaim in the present action would actually reward the
Appellant for delaying in filing his action until nearly the end of
the statutory time thereby prolonging the litigation process.
Finally, the court in Moffitt states that an interpretation
such as that supported by the Appellant "penalizes 'reluctant'
litigants, i.e., those who would rather avoid litigation than
assert the claims they possess, and who take the basically nonlitigious position that they will assert their claims only if the
other party brings litigation to fruition by filing a complaint
against them, their real preference being to stay out of court
altogether." Id. at 575.
Therefore, Appellee's counterclaim was clearly timely filed
and the trial court's denial of the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss
was correct.
completely

To overturn the trial court's ruling would be

against

the

intent

of

limitation

statutes.

The

Defendant would have preferred to stay out of court, having agreed
to drop his claim at the offer of the Plaintiff to "forget the
bill" on the defective work on the truck.

(Record at 247).

Defendant further testified that he just wanted to sell the truck
and did not want to sue to get it fixed. (Record at 256).

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS ONE AND SEVEN AND ALLOWING
TESTIMONY REGARDING SAID EXHIBITS.
"It

is

well

settled

that

trial

court

rulings

on

the

admissibility of evidence are not to be overturned in the absence
-16-

of a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879,
883 (Utah 1988) citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah
1986);

Utah

R.

Evid.

103(a).

"In

reviewing

questions

of

admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial
court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding
admissibility

will

not

be

overturned

absent

an

abuse

of

discretion." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990) citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1316.
"The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the
appellate court will presume that the discretion of the trial court
was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the
contrary." Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah
App. 1991)/ (Citations omitted).
In the present case, the Appellant has failed to show that the
trial court abused its discretion.

To the contrary, the record

clearly indicates that the trial court acted within its discretion
in allowing the Appellee to introduce said exhibits and testimony.
While the documents were not actually provided during the discovery
process, the Appellee did put the Appellant on notice of the
existence of the documents and the fact that they had yet to be
located.

Further, Exhibit #1 was a document originally initiated

by the Appellant which should have been readily available within
the Appellant's normal business records amd which the Plaintiff
should have produced in response to the Defendant's discovery
requests. (Record at 201).

Also, the trial court provided the

Appellant with every opportunity for voir dire and examination.
-17-

The Plaintiff's objection to the admissibility of the exhibits
and testimony is based solely on Rule 26(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. This rule in pertinent part provides that a party
must "seasonably" amend a prior discovery response when "he knows
that the response though correct when made is no longer trust and
circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in
substance a knowing concealment." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(e)(2). The
Plaintiff's argument fails on several major points.
First, the response to discovery was correct and true and the
Defendant contended throughout the discovery process that he had
purchased a rebuilt transmission from the Plaintiff and that he
knew that somewhere there existed documentation of said purchase.
The Defendant even attempted to discover this documentation from
the Plaintiff, who failed to produce the document in response to
the Defendant's discovery. (Record at 201).
Second, even if the discovery of Exhibits #1 and #7 could be
considered a change to a response the failure of which to amend
would constitute a "knowing concealment" under Rule 26, the rule
clearly states that the party must "seasonably" amend the response.
Defendant's counsel stated at trial in response to the Plaintiff's
objection to the admission of the exhibit that the exhibits were
produced just that morning (Record at 201).

This statement was

corroborated by the Defendant's testimony that he finally found the
documents with his tax information. (Record at 250). Producing the
exhibits

at

trial

with

the

Plaintiff

being

given

adequate

opportunity for voir dire and examination easily constitutes a
-18-

seasonable amendment under the circumstances.
Finally, even if Exhibits #1 and #7 were not admitted, they do
not go to a material question of fact which could not have been
proven easily in some other manner.

The Plaintiff claims error

based on the admission of these exhibits, but fails to show that
such admission affects a "substantial right" of the Plaintiff as
required in Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Basically,

the exhibits were used to set a value for the transmission, and not
to prove the elements

of the Defendant's

counterclaim.

Even

without the exhibits, the record clearly supports the trial court's
findings

that

the Plaintiff

lost the Defendant's

thereby damaging the Defendant.

transmission

The Defendant could have produced

additional evidence on the question of damages if, in the court's
discretion, such information was necessary.
The

record

clearly

supports

the

trial

court's

rulings

regarding said exhibits and testimony and the Plaintiff has failed
to show an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, the appellate court

should uphold the trial court's ruling.

III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS
The Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the
following:
1)

Appellee purchased a transmission for his Ford truck from

the Appellant;
2)

Appellee paid Appellant $3,299.37 for said transmission;

-19-

3)

Appellee was damaged by the loss of said transmission in

the amount of $3,299.36;
4)

Appellee's Exhibits #1 and #7 represented receipts for

payment by Appellee for said transmission.
The appellate court's review of issues of fact is "strictly
limited."

Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Company, 846 P.2d 1323,

1328 (Utah App. 1993) citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of
State Lands

and Forestry,

802 P.2d

720, 725

(Utah

Kimball v. Campell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
Appellant

"must marshal

all the evidence

1990);

and

Further, the

supporting

the trial

court's findings and demonstrate that despite such evidence the
factual findings are clearly erroneous."

McPherson v. Belnap, 830

P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992) citing Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213,
216 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis added).
The Appellant
failed

to

erroneous."

has failed to marshal the evidence and has

show that

the trial court's

.Id. at 304.

findings were

"clearly

Rather, the Appellant has selectively

presented a portion of the evidence as found in the record to
attempt to prove his version of the facts.

The trial court was

clearly in the best position to weigh all of the evidence, which
included testimony and exhibits from both the Appellant and the
Appellee, and make the factual findings based on the totality of
said evidence.
As for the specific findings challenged by the Plaintiff, the
record clearly supports the findings.

The Defendant's exhibits #1

and #7 document the Defendant's purchase of a transmission from the
-20-

Plaintiff for the amount of $3,299.37.

This fact is further

supported by the testimony of Hugh Williams (Record at 240-241,
250) and Duffy Williams (Record at 258).
The fact that the Defendant was damaged is proven by the
testimony of Steve Flanders, a friend of the Plaintiff's and the
person who purchased the subject truck.
that

he

expected

to

receive

either

Mr. Flanders testified
the

transmission

or

reimbursement for said transmission from the Defendant. (Record at
177-178).

This fact is further supported by the testimony of the

Defendant (Record at 255). The Plaintiff would like the appellate
court to believe that because Mr. Flanders had not yet been
reimbursed by the Defendant for the missing transmission at the
time of trial, Mr. Flanders was not looking to the Defendant for
reimbursement

—

a twist on the facts which would completely

contradict the direct testimony of Mr. Flanders himself.
Based on the Appellant's total failure to marshal the evidence
and the fact that the appellate court is to review the facts from
the record

"in the light most favorable to the trial court's

findings," Hoth v. White at 216, citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d
474, 474 (Utah 1990), the appellate court in the present action
must uphold the trial court's findings of fact.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE.
Again,

conclusions

of

law

are

reviewed

on

appeal

for

correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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The facts as shown at trial support the Appellee's argument
that:
1)

Appellee's truck had a transmission when the Appellant

took possession of the truck for the purpose of repairing said
truck (Testimony of Plaintiff —
Defendant —

Record at 211-212, Testimony of

throughout, Testimony of Duffy Williams —

Record at

263);
2)

Said transmission had a value of $3,299.37 (Exhibits #1

and #7, Testimony of Defendant —
3)
Steve

Said truck was sold by Appellee with a transmission to

Flanders

(Testimony

of

Testimony of Steve Flanders —
4)

Record at 234-236, 250);

Defendant

—

Record

at

245-246,

Record at 176-177);

Said transmission was missing from the truck when Steve

Flanders received the truck from the Appellant (Record at 179-180
amd 196);
5)

At the time of trial, Steve Flanders was still looking to

the Appellee to provide the transmission or compensation for said
transmission (Record at 177-178);
6)
$3,299.37

Appellee
by

the

was,

therefore,

Appellant's

damaged

loss

or

in

the

conversion

amount
of

of
the

transmis s ion.
Therefore, the trial court properly ordered judgment for the
Appellee to compensate him for the Appellant's acts as related to
the missing transmission.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT OR
FOR A NEW TRIAL •
Again, the trial court's decision will not be overturned

absent an abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc..
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Moon Lake Electr. Ass'n. v.
Ultrasvstems W. Constr. Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
In the present case, the Appellant argues that the Appellee
committed perjury and therefore the trial court's judgment should
have been amended or, alternatively, a new trial should have been
granted. In the court's finding on this question it clearly states
that

its decision was based on

presented

at trial, not

"a totality of the evidence

just the documentation relied on by

Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court considered the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testified, and was persuaded that Plaintiff's
testimony was not reliable, either because of loss of recollection,
lack of knowledge claimed, or intentional falsification. •• (Record
at 120, emphasis added).
The trial court was in the best position to weigh the evidence
and judge the credibility and truthfulness of the witnesses.
Merely making unsupported accusations of perjury can not possibly
meet the requirement of showing an abuse of discretion.

As

demonstrated earlier, there are more than adequate facts within the
record to support the trial court's decision and, therefore, the
appellate court should affirm said decision.
-23-

CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings were clearly within its discretion
and its Order for judgment against the Plaintiff was clearly
correct.

Therefore, the court on appeal should affirm the trial

court's order.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Judgment entered by
the trial court be affirmed and that the Defendant be allowed to
pursue collection of said judgment.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1994.

DEL "6. ROWE
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellee
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APPENDIX A
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

II.

FINDING REGARDING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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DEL B. ROWE (#2813)
Attorney for Defendant
535 West 500 South #4
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 298-0640

______
yP^'Jajfer*

IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT
oooOooo
NELSON'S DIESEL SERVICE,

)

*Wf} T,*

A'^^O^v
^^""-*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
HUGH WILLIAMS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 920000260CV
)
oooOooo

This matter was tried before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson on
February 16, 1993, and pursuant to the testimony the file, the
evidence and argument the court makes the following findings of
fact:
1.

That the Defendant had the Plaintiff install a rebuilt

transmission in Plaintiff's truck in June 1987 for $3,299.77. Said
full amount was paid the Plaintiff by the Defendant on August 17,
1987.
2.

That the Plaintiff did other repair on the Defendant's

vehicle on about August 28, 1987 in the sum of $565.91 and the
Plaintiff did further work on the said same truck on September 28,
1987 in the sum of $488.78 for a total due the Plaintiff by the
Defendant of $1,054.69.
3. The Defendant had not, prior to trial, paid the Plaintiff
for this work. The Defendant owes these amounts to Plaintiff plus
-26-

interest to February 16, 1993 of 10% until judgment is entered.
4.

On January 11, 1988 the Plaintiff was called by the

Defendant's to diagnose a noise in the engine of said truck which
was disabled at Honda of Bountiful. The Defendant diagnosed said
vehicle erroneously and drove the vehicle to 2600 Sout£\800 West in
Bountiful where the engine froze and then said m
towed to Plaintiff's business.

vehicle was

It was then discovered after the

Plaintiff removed the Defendant's transmission that it was in fact
a piston that was frozen in the engine. That it is why this noise
problem caused the engine to stop.
5.

The Defendant then sold said vehicle to one Flanders

representing that it had a bad engine but that the transmission was
good which representations were made by the Defendant to Mr.
Flanders.
6.

Plaintiff took out the transmission and lost it on about

January 11, 1988.

However, Plaintiff had a duty to protect said

transmission but breached said duty by losing said transmission.
7. The value as of January 11, 1988 of said transmission was
$3,299.37 as it was installed in June of 1987 by the Plaintiff for
the Defendant. There was no diminution of value from June of 1987
to January 1988.

The Plaintiff owes the Defendant the sum of

$3,299.37 for said lost transmission plus interest at 10% from
January 11, 1987 until judgment is entered.
8.

Pursuant to the allegations of the Defendant that the

Plaintiff damaged the engine, the Defendant has not proven said
point and, therefore, should not receive judgment on damages to the
engine.
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9.

The court finds that the parties are to bear their own

attorneys fees and costs.
10. The claim

for $236.40 by the Plaintiff

against the

Defendant is hereby dismissed.
11. Flanders was told by the Defendant that the transmission
went with the truck.
12. Mr. Williams did in fact tell Mr. Flanders that he would
therefore get a transmission for the truck as the Plaintiff had
lost said transmission to said truck.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact the court makes the
following Conclusions of Law:
1.

That

judgment be entered

for the Defendant

on his

counterclaim against the Plaintiff in the sum of $3,299.37 with
statutory interest of 10% from January 11, 1988, to present in the
sum of $1,649.70, for a total of $4,949.07.
2.

The Defendant

shall be given

judgment

against the

Plaintiff in the sum $1,054.69 plus statutory interest of 10% from
September 1987, to present in the sum of $580.09, for a total of
$1,634.78.
3. Therefore, the net judgment for the Defendant against the
Plaintiff shall be $3,314.29 plus interest at 12% per annum from
the date judgment is entered.
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6fc
4.

The parties bear their own costs and fees.

DATED this

//

day of Fobruaryr 1993.

BY THE^CQURT

JUDGE/ROGER S. DUTSON

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was mailed to: CHARLES A. SCHULTZ,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 345 East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 1993. A
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/]U

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPTARTMENT

NELSON DIESEL SERVICE
Plaintiff
VS

FINDING
92-260

HUGH WILLIAMS
Defendant

This Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motion to modify or amend
Judgment or for a New Trial. Without considering the issue of
timeliness of said motions, the Court notes that the decison made is
based on a totality of the evidence presented at trial, not just the
documentation relied on by Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court
considered the demeanor of the witneses as they testified, and was
persuaded that Plaintiffs testimony was not reliable, either because
of loss of recollection, lack of knowledge claimed or intentional
falsification. The Court denies Plainfiff's motion dated 3-25-93.
Dated this /T^of May, 1993

Hon. Reger S. Dutson
Circuit Court Judge
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MAY141993
SHAaONMuWES.cier-,
fourth Circuit Court
"^r+To**

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the t /nV^dav of June, 1994, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to be
delivered

to

the persons

at

the

addresses

listed

below by

depositing copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid.
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Appellant
P.O. Box 1516
Sandy, Utah 84092

At
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